In the contemporary ecological literature, the instrumental approach to nature is convincingly discredited and it is acknowledged that man's goals and the means for achieving them must be brought into accord with ecological demands. Moreover, the spiritual importance of nature for man is recognized: through contact with nature man can be morally improved. Ecological knowledge acquires a moral coloration and significance; the philosopher merely has to reveal and analyze the intellectual foundations of this knowledge, formulate by relying on them the (...) general principles of an ecological ethics, and then draw from them standards and rules for human behavior, the criteria for what is inadmissible and for what must be from an ecological as well as a moral perspective. In a word, knowledge obliges. (shrink)

In the contemporary ecological literature, the instrumental approach to nature is convincingly discredited and it is acknowledged that man's goals and the means for achieving them must be brought into accord with ecological demands. Moreover, the spiritual importance of nature for man is recognized: through contact with nature man can be morally improved. Ecological knowledge acquires a moral coloration and significance; the philosopher merely has to reveal and analyze the intellectual foundations of this knowledge, formulate by relying on them the (...) general principles of an ecological ethics, and then draw from them standards and rules for human behavior, the criteria for what is inadmissible and for what must be from an ecological as well as a moral perspective. In a word, knowledge obliges. (shrink)

Sustained attention, a key cognitive skill that improves during childhood and adolescence, tends to be worse in some emotional and behavioural disorders. Sustained attention is typically studied in non-affective task contexts; here, we used a novel task to index performance in affective versus neutral contexts across adolescence (N = 465; ages 11–18). We asked whether: (i) performance would be worse in negative versus neutral task contexts; (ii) performance would improve with age; (iii) affective interference would be greater in younger adolescents; (...) (iv) adolescents at risk for depression and higher in anxiety would show overall worse performance; and (v) would show differential performance in negative contexts. Results indicated that participants performed more poorly in negative contexts and showed age-related performance improvements. Those at risk of depression performed more poorly than those at lower risk. However, there was no difference between groups as a result of affective context. For anxiety there was no difference in performance as a function of severity. However, those with higher anxiety showed less variance in their reaction times to negative stimuli than those with lower anxiety. One interpretation is that moderate levels of emotional arousal associated with anxiety make individuals less susceptible to the distracting effects of negative stimuli. (shrink)

Lives and work of Veṅkaṭanātha (Vedantadesika), 1268-1369, and Maṇavāḷa Māmun̲i, 1370-1444, Vaishnavite leaders and exponents of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school in Hindu philosophy from Tamil Nadu.

Stable adaptive strategy of Homo sapiens (SASH) is a result of the integration in the three-module fractal adaptations based on three independent processes of generation, replication, and the implementation of adaptations — genetic, socio-cultural and symbolic ones. The evolutionary landscape SASH is a topos of several evolutionary multi-dimensional vectors: 1) extraversional projective-activity behavioral intention (adaptive inversion 1), 2) mimesis (socio-cultural inheritance), 3) social (Machiavellian) intelligence, 4) the extension of inter-individual communication beyond their own social groups and their own species in (...) the rest of the world, 5) the symbolic system of communication (symbolic inheritance), 6) spiritualistic trans- formation of emotionally-shaped components of mentality, 7) the dominance of the rationalist thought mentality (enhancer of adaptive inverse 1), 8) a recursive distribution of projective-activity intentions on the man himself his genome, psyche and culture (Adaptive Inversion 2), 9) introversional reorientation of the vector of cognitive activity (adaptive inversion 3). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reading and Writing PlatoCharles L. GriswoldThe Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues, by Ruby Blondell; 452 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, $55.00Plato's Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure, and Myth in theSymposium, by Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan; 266 pp. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004, $25.00Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of Plato, by Drew Hyland; ix & 202 pp. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004, $44.00The (...) People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics, by Debra Nails; 414 pp. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002, $75.00.Why did Plato write dialogues? How should his dialogues be read (does the literary form matter, for example, to our getting at the heart of what Plato is saying)? These questions are now familiar in contemporary Plato scholarship, and their answers—which undoubtedly are interconnected—are the subject of lively and fascinating exploration. Any doubt that Platonic studies flourishes would quickly be put to rest by the four books under review here.It was once thought that attention to the "dramatic dimension" of Plato's literary-philosophical productions was the province of two much despised schools of thought: "the Straussians," and "the Continentals." The first of these was viewed as advocating a dangerous combination of esotericism (the idea that somehow Plato's meaning is not on the surface of the dialogues, but concealed in them, as though they were a cryptogram), elitism (the idea that the true Plato is only available to [End Page 205] "the few"—such as the Straussians, according to themselves anyhow), and unphilosophical and dilettantish meanderings about this or that literarily cast "teaching." Straussian hermeneutics was thought to open the way to unprincipled appeals to irony whenever it suited the interpreter, so that any text could end up saying pretty much whatever the interpreter wished for it to say, including the opposite of what the surface of the dialogue appeared to say. And further, it was thought (perhaps in a manner at odds with the "unprincipled interpretation" charge) that the Straussians' mode of "taking into account" the dramatic context—and in particular their contextualization of claims made in the dialogues such that this or that claim gets "explained" as a rhetorical gesture addressed by character X to character Y in context Z, a gesture whose content and validity, so to speak, are limited to that exchange—robs the dialogue of its philosophical content. Hence the worry that Straussian hermeneutics leads to skepticism about the possibility of philosophy itself—philosophy understood precisely in the way that it is regularly spoken of in the Platonic dialogues, namely as the effort to transcend perspective and partiality and to grasp through argument the essence of the matter as such. To cap it off, there is the background suspicion that Straussians are politically conservative, in a way that is somehow connected with their interpretation of Plato.There is more than a kernel of truth in the view that Straussians have insisted on the hermeneutic importance of the dialogue form, taking their cue from Strauss's own remarks in such texts as The City and Man. He did argue that Plato's meaning is not on the surface (and thus in some sense is esoteric), that it was intended by Plato to be available to "the few" while not debunking the beliefs of "the many," and that Plato is an ironist. There is also warrant for the worries about unprincipled interpretation, as well as about the reduction of philosophy to a sort of literary sensibility substituting for genuine philosophical argument (where, after all, are Strauss's arguments for any philosophical position, whether or not about a Platonic "teaching"?). And it is by and large true, so far as I can tell, that his self-identified followers are politically conservative (in the contemporary American sense), and in a way somehow tied to their interpretation of Plato.I myself find Strauss's interpretation of Plato to be deeply problematic both in its substance and its method (I put aside the issue of the political conservatism of Strauss's followers, a "teaching" I also find objectionable). And while I join the authors of the four... (shrink)

Man; destiny; Islamic philosophy; Ph. D. dissertation.

The beginnings of unity and order in living things, by C. M. Child.--On the structure of the unconscious, by K. Koffka.--The genesis of social reactions in the young child, by J. E. Anderson.--The unconscious of the behaviorist, by J. B. Watson.--The unconscious patterning of behavior in society by E. Sapir.--The configurations of personality, by W. I. Thomas.--The prenatal and early postnatal phenomena of consciousness, by M. E. Kenworthy.--Values in social psychology, by F. L. Wells.--Higher levels of mental integration, by W. (...) A. White. (shrink)

The central role played by Darwin's analogy between selection under domestication and that under nature has been adequately appreciated, but I have indicated how important the domesticated organisms also were to other elements of Darwin's theory of evolution-his recognition of “the constant principle of change,” for instance, of the imperfection of adaptation, and of the extent of variation in nature. The further development of his theory and its presentation to the public likewise hinged on frequent reference to domesticates.We have seen (...) that Darwin's reliance on the analogy between domesticated varieties and wild species was a bold and original step, in light of contemporary views on the nature of domesticates. However, as Darwin undoubtedly foresaw, his reliance on the analogy created difficulties as well as solving problems, and these began with his Malthusian codiscoverer of the principle of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace. Wallace's paper “On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type,” presented to the Linnean Scoiety along with the first public unveiling of Darwin's theory, states: We see, then, that no inferences as to varieties in a state of nature can be deduced from the observation of those occurring among domestic animals. The two are so much opposed to each other in every circumstance of their existence, that what applies to the one is almost sure not to apply to the other. Domestic animals are abnormal, irregular, artificial; they are subject to varieties which never occur and never can occur in a state of nature.62Much has been made of the similarity of views of Darwin and Wallace, but this quotation surely reveals how utterly different their views were on what to Darwin was an important matter. Several critics of the Origin saw Darwin's reliance on the domesticates as his Achilles heel. As Young has pointed out, Samuel Wilberforce included the following passage in his attack on the Origin: Nor must we pass over unnoticed the transference of the argument from the domesticated to the untamed animals. Assuming that man as the selector can do much in a limited time, Mr. Darwin argues that Nature, a more powerful, a more continuous power, working over vastly extended ranges of time, can do more. But why should Nature, so uniform and persistent in all her operations, tend in this instance to change? Why should she become a selector of varieties?63Another critic, Fleeming Jenkin, found the analogy a weakness in Darwin's theory because of the limited extent of variation in any one direction in domestic animals and plants.64 We have already seen that Darwin had confided a similar view to his notebook thirty years earlier, but changed his mind as a result of his profound study of domesticates. De Beer's reference to “an English country gentleman's knowledge of domestic plants and animals and their breeding”65 fails totally to recognize the originality and depth of Darwin's knowledge of domesticates.Why did Darwin, against the currents of his time, rely so heavily on mankind's experience with domesticated organisms to shape his theory about species in nature? On reason is that only with domesticates was an approach that came close to experimental verification possible. Darwin fully realized the inadequacies of the experiment, as is emphasized by his repeated contrasting of selection under nature and selection by man. Yet the extensive experience and data of plant and animal breeders offered the only reliable base against which Darwin could continually challenge his views. As he wrote in the introduction to Variation, with domestication, “man ... may be said to have been trying an experiment on a gigantic scale.”66 Given Darwin's high opinion of the quantitative work of Malthus and Quetelet (as emphasized by Schweber),67 and his unremitting efforts to secure data by which to test his theories, it was inevitable that he should attach high significance to domesticated varieties. John Tyndall, in his Belfast address of 1874, said: “The strength of the doctrine of Evolution consists, not in experimental demonstration (for the subject is hardly accessible to this mode of proof), but in its general harmony with scientific thought.”68 Darwin would have agreed with the latter thought, but I think he would have challenged the preceding one on the grounds that long experience with domesticated varieties did provide an element of experimental demonstration. It gave him confidence in his theory, and he used his vast knowledge of artificial selection boldly and creatively. (shrink)

Siehe dazu Pausanias I 37, 7 δρκων φνη σπουδ κατ τν φωλεν ιν. Mit Unrecht hat man bestritten, dass das Emporfahren des Hermes als ein ιναι bezeichnet werden könne; sonst müsste man sich auch darüber wundern, wie einer Schlange das ἰναι zugeschrieben wird. σπουδ ν ist doch wohl rein formelhaft von schneller Bewegung gebraucht worden; ich glaube hier eine Bestätigung meiner Darlegungen im Kommentar z. St. zu finden. Doch nun zu Wichtigerem. T. W. Allen ist in dieser Zeitschrift für die (...) Lesung γκαλωρν im Mosquensis am Schluss von Vs. 82 neuerdings eingetreten; es bleibt mir nichts übrig, als seinen Gründen beizupflichten, und ich kann zu meiner Entschuldigung nur anführen, dass auch A. Ludwich, der gewiss viele griechische Handschriften gesehen hat, γκαλωρς zu erkennen glaubte. γκαλωρν ergibt vor allem die einfachere Lösung: τν ττε συνδσας νεοθηλ ν' γκαλον rho;ην. νεοθηλα ρην ist nun Objekt von συνδσας ν' γκαλον adverbiale Bestimmung, durch die ausgedrückt wird, dass Hermes je ein, d.h. zwei Armvoll nahm, entsprechend den anzufertigenden zwei Sandalen. (shrink)

Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov is one of the most original and as yet inadequately studied Russian thinkers. Neither a professional philosopher, nor a well-known scholar, nor a critical essayist, he led a kind of double existence while working as an ordinary civil servant, developing his original philosophy at his leisure in the hours free from his intensive daily work. Fedorov's life was one of selflessness and self-denial, not at all eventful outwardly. He graduated from the Gymnasium in Tambov and completed three (...) years of study in the Law Department of the Richelieu Lyceum in Odessa, after which he taught for a number of years in the Borovsk, Lipetsk, Podol'sk, and other regional schools. The quarter century he spent working in the Library of the Rumiantsev Museum in Moscow was the most stable period in Fedorov's life. Fedorov's ideas attracted the attention of outstanding cultural figures. F.M. Dostoevskii became acquainted with them in 1878 through Peterson, and on March 24 of that year he wrote: "I am essentially in full accord with these ideas. I read them as if they were my own." L.N. Tolstoy, who knew Fedorov personally, said, "I am proud to be living in the same times as such a man." V.S. Solov'ev, who also associated with Fedorov, wrote to him as follows in the mid-1880s: "Your ‘project’ is the human spirit's first advance along the path of Christ since the advent of Christianity. As for me, I can only acknowledge you as my teacher and spiritual father." A.M. Gorky was especially impressed by the activism in Fedorov's views. But none of this precludes the many and very essential divergences of these authors from Fedorov. One can find some links with his ideas in A.N. Belyi, V. Ia. Briusov, N.A. Zabolotskii, V.V. Maiakovskii, A.P. Platonov, M.M. Prishvin, I.L. Sel'vinskii, O.D. Forsh, and V.N. Khlebnikov. The artist B.N. Chekrygin drafted a large fresco entitled The Resurrection of the Dead [Voskreshenie mertvykh] and a philosophical work entitled The Synod of the Resurrecting Museum [Sobor voskreshaiushchego muzeia], both inspired by Fedorov's teachings. (shrink)

The article discusses how the meaning of the principle of “non-resistance to evil by violence” was changing in L.N. Tolstoy's religious and philosophical teachings and how this principle was evaluated in Russian religious philosophy of the late XIX - early XX century. In the first version of Tolstoy’s teachings, set forth in the book “What is my faith?”, the principle of non-resistance was understood in a moral sense, as the norm for all people; its execution should lead to the perfection (...) of earthly life. This idea of L. Tolstoy was sharply criticised by his contemporaries, who noted that there was no truly religious content in Tolstoy’s teachings, it was turning into a utilitarian doctrine of the earthly progress of mankind. Given this criticism, Tolstoy in his later works changed his understanding of the principle of non-resistance. Drawing a distinction between two levels of human life - “animal” and divine, Tolstoy recognised the principle of non-resistance to the law as the divine life of a man. As a result, the principle of non-resistance has acquired a religious rather than moral meaning, since the transition of a man to a divine life means a mystical transformation of his being. He is aware of his super-spatial and super-temporary unity with all people and with all being, and therefore can evaluate the consequences of his actions not only in the limited sphere of his life, but also in all infinite being. In this regard, a person realizes the absolute superiority of good deeds over evil, even if the latter are committed to confront evil. It is shown that some critics of Tolstoy came to a similar understanding of the religious meaning of the principle of non-resistance at the end of their lives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SCANDAL OF ORIGINS IN ROUSSEAU Jeremiah L. Alberg University of West Georgia To speak of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and scandal is not difficult. Immediately one thinks of his relationship with Mme de Warens, his lover and his beloved mama. Most of his works upset some group or another—other intellectuals (the Discourse on the Sciences andArts), the Genevan authorities (the "Dedication" the Discourse on Inequality), the Church (Emile)—the list could (...) go on and on. In this article I would like to turn away from our usual use ofthe word scandal and look more deeply at the connection between Rousseau's system and the theological or, more properly, the biblical notion of scandal. This notion is obscure. While no one would deny its importance in the New Testament, trying to develop a coherent "theory ofscandal" from the various usages in the New Testament has proven difficult.1 To give only one example of the problem, Christ crucified is proclaimed as a scandal (ICor 1.23) and yet the Christians who follow him are forbidden to cause scandal to others (ICor 8.9), especially the younger and weaker. 1 For a basic understanding ofthe biblical notion ofscandal the following titles are helpful' G. Stählin, Skandalen Untersuchungen zur Geschichte eines biblischen Begriffs, (Gütersloh. Bertelsmann, 1930), as well as his article "Skandalen, skandahzo" in Theologisches Wörterbuch des Neuen Testaments, ed Kittel and Friedrich, 7 339-58, J Calvin, ConcerningScandals (translation oíDe scandalis. 1550) (Grand Rapids Eerdmans, 1 978), H Bintz. Das Skandalen als Grundlagenproblem derDogmata. (Berlin de Gruyter. 1969), D McCracken, The Scandal ofthe Gospels Jesus, Story, and Offense, (NY Oxford UP, 1994); J Alison, The Joy ofBeing Wrong Original Sm Through Easter Eyes (NY Crossroad, 1998) 140-146; G. Bailie, Violence Unveiled Humanity at the Crossroads (NY Crossroad, 1995) 207-2 10; R Girard, Des choses cachées depuis lafoundation du monde, (éditions Grasset et Fasqelle, 1978) especially 573-592 2 Jeremiah L. Alberg The most successful attempt at bringing coherence to the various elements of scandal has been carried out in the various works of René Girard.2 His basic insight was to see in biblical scandal an inchoate theory of human desire. Girard calls this desire "mimetic" or desire that one receives from another. This type of desire leads to scandal. It is here that the connection with Rousseau becomes evident. The famous literary theorist T. Todorov states: "the 'mimetic desire' of Girard is only another name for the amour-propre ofRousseau" (Todorov 38). For his part Girard defines theskandalon (that which causes the scandal) in the following way: It is not an obstacle thatjust happens to be there and merely has to be got out ofthe way; it is the model exerting its special form of temptation, causing attraction to the extent that it is an obstacle and forming an obstacle to the extent that it can attract. (Girard 1987, 416) Rousseau's analysis of amour-propre as that which excites without satisfying, seduces without delivering, and promises without fulfilling, parallels Girard's analysis ofmimetic desire as the doomed-to-be-frustrated reaching for the scanáalon3 Thus, I am arguing that in his various works Rousseau is developing the conceptual possibilities of biblical scandal. While there would be many way's of showing this structural parallel between Rousseau's thought and biblical scandal, I will concentrate on a reading ofthe "Preface" to the Discours sur l'origine et lesfondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes (1755), in order to show that this work is structured by scandal. It is structured by a human desire that seeks what is unattainable and renders the object unattainable in the very seeking after it. More concretely, 1 shall argue that in the "Preface" Rousseau is able to reduce the question aboutthe origin ofinequality "to its genuine state" only 2 See the work cited above as well as his more recent / See Satan Fall Like Lightning ' Rousseau's definition of amour-propre makes its connection with offense (another translation of the biblical word for scandal) quite clear. Speaking of man in the primitive state he remarks. "For the same reason [that he is not capable ofmaking comparisons... (shrink)

In their debate over my interpretation of Heidegger's account of das Man in Being and Time, Frederick Olafson and Taylor Carman agree that Heidegger's various characterizations of das Man are inconsistent. Olafson champions an existentialist/ontic account of das Man as a distorted mode of being?with. Carman defends a Wittgensteinian/ontological account of das Man as Heidegger's name for the social norms that make possible everyday intelligibility. For Olafson, then, das Man is a privative mode of Dasein, while for Carman it makes (...) up an important aspect of Dasein's positive constitution. Neither interpreter takes seriously the other's account, though both acknowledge both readings are possible. How should one choose between these two interpretations? I suggest that we choose the interpretation that identifies the phenomenon the work is examining, gives the most internally consistent account of that phenomenon, and shows the compatibility of this account with the rest of the work. (shrink)

Is the virtue of the good citizen the same as the virtue of the good man? Aristotle addresses this in Politics 3.4. His answer is twofold. On the one hand, (the account for Difference) they are not the same both because what the citizen’s virtue is depends on the constitution, on what preserves it, and on the role the citizen plays in it, and because the good citizens in the best constitution cannot all be good men, whereas the good man’s (...) virtue is uniform. On the other hand, (the account for Identity) the two virtues are identical in the good men in the best constitution, in which all are good citizens, each possessing the ability for ruling and for being ruled. This nuanced answer can be seen as Aristotle’s synthesis of a Periclean view (contribution to state blots out personal wrongs) and a Socratic view (no good citizen is without justice). Its nuances reflect the extent to which Aristotle’s conceptions of good citizenship and the best constitution accommodate deviations of what is probable from the human ideal set out in his ethical writings. In the present chapter, I will first address three puzzles regarding the nuances of Aristotle’s answer. Second, I will consider one question about its implication: Does Aristotle’s account for Difference turn out to entail something ultra-Periclean: that no one can simultaneously be a good man and a good citizen in any constitution other than the best? I shall argue the negative. (shrink)

Pummer : 43–77, 2014) ingeniously wraps together issues from the personal identity literature with issues from the literature on desert. However, I wish to take issue with the main conclusion that he draws, namely, that we need to rethink the following principle: Desert.: When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal they ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably (...) did wrong—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. :43–77, 2014: 43–44) Pummer offers an argument that is intended to show that this principle, along with widely-held views about personal identity, entails an inconsistent triad of propositions. I agree. But I think Pummer's argument attacks a straw man. I believe that no-one holds Desert, at least as it is stated, and that once the principle is stated correctly it is easy to see that no inconsistent triad follows from it. So, Desert does not need rethinking. It just needs to be stated correctly. (shrink)

Løgstrups hovedværk fra 1956 med nyt efterskrift ved Hans Fink. “Så vist som et menneske med den tillid, det viser eller begærer, giver mer eller mindre af sit liv i den andens hånd, så vist hører fordringen om at tage vare på det liv med til vor tilværelse sådan som den nu engang er. Hvor meget eller hvor lidt der står på spil for et menneske i den tillid, det viser, er selvsagt uhyre forskelligt. Det beror på mange forskellige faktorer, (...) på den enkeltes psykiske konstitution og øjeblikkelige befindende, på situationen, der ikke mindst er bestemt af, hvem og hvordan den anden er. Men hvorom alting er, betyder det, at der i et hvilket som helst møde mellem mennesker ligger en uudtalt fordring, uanset under hvilke omstændigheder mødet finder sted og hvilken karakter det har.” "Klassiker. Hvis man tror, at Løgstrups etiske fordring er et pladderhumanistisk budskab om næstekærlighed og at »tage vare på hinanden«, så er genudgivelsen en passende lejlighed til at få den læst. (...) Løgstrups fænomenologiske analyser af forholdet mellem mennesker og af vore selvbedrageriske bortforklaringer af vore egne reaktioner på andre er stadig dugfriske, som var de skrevet i går." Niels Højlund, Weekendavisen. (shrink)

K.E. Løgstrups monografi om Immanuel Kants erkendelsesteoretiske hovedværk 'Kritik af den rene fornuft'. Med efterskrift af Peter Aaboe Sørensen. "De metafysiske spørgsmål bliver stående; de er givet med vor fornufts naturanlæg. Måske mere end nogen anden videnskab er metafysikken lagt i os, og dens spørgsmål er alt andet end tilfældige. Man kan lige så lidt vente, at menneskets ånd helt ville opgive metafysiske undersøgelser, som man kan vente, at vi ville indstille at trække vejret for at undgå at indånde uren (...) luft. Om bogens efterskrift m.m.: "... han [Peter Aaboe Sørensen] gør det glimrende. Vi får for eksempel at vide, at bogens hovedafsnit udkom første gang så tidligt som i 1952, i en periode, hvor de teologiske professorer i Århus bestræbte sig på at skrive små filosofi-historiske monografier til deres studerende. Aaboe gør også meget relevant rede for den biografiske baggrund for Løgstrups engagement i Kant: Som studerende havde han selv haft enorme vanskeligheder med at forstå den tyske gigant. Først i det tredje studieår lykkedes det ham ved ren stædighed og vilje at få fat. Nu ville han forstå det. Dette resultat af veloverstået kamp kom senere tiders studerende og nutidens læsere til gode i den klare og myndige præsentation af Kants tanker, som er temmelig vanskelige at gå til uden mellemled." Nils Gunder Hansen, Kristeligt Dagblad. (shrink)

An original attempt at phenomenological description from a subjective starting-point, which Desan calls the totum genus humanum--i.e., the human race as a whole, surviving through time. From this standpoint, the "truth" of any individual's judgment or even philosophical system is seen to be "angular," or fragmentary. The planetary man is the exceptional person who attempts to coordinate various angular truths to arrive at the generic truth; but in the end his coordination, too, falls short of any Absolute Truth. The implications (...) of this position for language, a new logic, and the concept of God are explored. Some of the angular truths that the book offers and their mode of presentation are novel.--W. L. M. (shrink)

In previous articles I have been concerned with various aspects of science; and I have now to endeavour to look at scientific activity as a whole, and to view it in its relation to other activities of man. I have been trying to avoid those pleasant sweeping generalizations which strike the imagination and which are so easy to write and to read about: such as that science is our only avenue to truth; or that science is abstract and tells us (...) nothing about the concrete nature of things; or that knowledge of particular facts is the object of science, generalizations being merely a means thereto; or that generalizations are the object of science, investigation of particular facts being merely a means thereto; all of which can be defended by a rich array of arguments, none of which can finally stand confrontation with the actual nature of scientific activity as a whole. The situation seems to be much more complicated than any such generalizations would suggest. (shrink)

In previous articles I have been concerned with various aspects of science; and I have now to endeavour to look at scientific activity as a whole, and to view it in its relation to other activities of man. I have been trying to avoid those pleasant sweeping generalizations which strike the imagination and which are so easy to write and to read about: such as that science is our only avenue to truth; or that science is abstract and tells us (...) nothing about the concrete nature of things; or that knowledge of particular facts is the object of science, generalizations being merely a means thereto; or that generalizations are the object of science, investigation of particular facts being merely a means thereto; all of which can be defended by a rich array of arguments, none of which can finally stand confrontation with the actual nature of scientific activity as a whole. The situation seems to be much more complicated than any such generalizations would suggest. (shrink)

Chapter I MAN IN EAST AND WEST: HIS DIVISION AND HIS UNITY The problems of man in our world in our times are often conceived in terms of the separation ...

Few years pass without an attempt to interpret Theocritus, Idyll 7. The poem's narrative and descriptive skill, dramatic subtlety and felicity of language are mercifully more than adequate to survive these scholarly onslaughts, so I have less hesitation in offering my own interpretation. The poem's chief problems seem to me to arise from uncertainty as to: Who is the narrator, and why are we kept waiting until line 21 before we are told that he is called Simichidas? Who, or what (...) sort of man, is the goatherd Lycidas, whom he encounters on his way from town to the harvest festival? Answers to these questions fundamentally affect our interpretation of their exchange of songs, which occupies almost half the idyll, and of Lycidas' gift of his stick to Simichidas; and these interpretations will go far towards interpreting the poem as a whole. (shrink)

This paper explores how the "environmental turn" for the last 25 years has been shaping remembrance of the destruction of Europe's Jewish populations. I argue that climate change is not just one more catastrophe to pass into the broad analogical field of the Holocaust. In fact, international Holocaust consciousness and understandings of what we now call the Anthropocene have long been intertwined and mutually constitutive. The paper starts in the 1990s with acclaimed writers Anne Michaels and W.G. Sebald, who sought (...) to recast the Holocaust's significance to modernity against a long backdrop of geologic time. Their memorial fiction, which grounds the history of the Holocaust in the eroding landscapes of Europe, reflects a growing and urgent global concern for the vulnerability of the environment and a sense of man's responsibility for preserving human and biological life. The paper then moves through more contemporary examples of the sublimation of Holocaust memory in discourse about global warming—evident in terms like "climate change denial" and calls to "bear witness" to mass extinction events. For better or worse, journalists and scholars who write about environmental activism frequently call on memory of World War II and genocide in order to redefine what constitutes "grievable life." Example authors include historian Timothy Snyder, who has predicted that climate change may lead to new genocidal wars over Lebensraum ; scientist James Lovelock, who has urged nation states to consider how to limit the coming influx of climate refugees; theorist Bruno Latour, who has argued, via Nazi philosopher Carl Schmitt, that we must "name our enemies" in the new climate wars; and essayist Ari Brostoff who has attempted to think climate catastrophe through Walter Benjamin's meditations on the angel of history. The implicit question in all of their work is this: What histories and philosophical traditions can help us redefine humanity's entangled relationship to nature in order to take political responsibility for saving life on Earth? In other words, the Anthropocene requires "a usable past"—but what will that usable past be? (shrink)